This paper extends the Barro (1990) model with single aggregate government spending and one flat income tax to include public expenditures and taxes by multiple levels of government. It derives the rate of endogenous growth and, with both simulations and special examples, examines how that rate changes with respect to federal income tax, local taxes, and federal transfers. It also discusses the growth and welfare-maximizing choices of taxes and federal transfers.
Introduction
In an endogenous growth model, Barro (1990) has examined the effects on economic growth of aggregate government spending, including both aggregate public consumption and aggregate public investment. Subsequent work has extended Barro's analysis by looking into the composition of government expenditures and economic growth. For example, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1998) have studied the growth effects of public spending on education, transportation, defense, and social welfare. Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) , Hulten (1994) , and Devarajan, Xie, and Zou (1998) , among many others, have paid particular attention to the 1 We are indebted to the Professors Cuong Le Van and Myrna Wooders for their useful comments and help in revising this paper. This research was sponsored by the National Science Foundation for Distinguished Young Scholars (70725006). 2 Mailing address: Liutang Gong, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing, 100871, China. Tel: (8610) Fax: (8610) 6275-3178; E-mail: ltgong@gsm.pku.edu.cn. association between infrastructure and output growth. 3 However, the structure of public expenditures and taxes among different levels of government has a fundamental impact on economic growth in light of the arguments related to fiscal federalism; see Oates (1972 Oates ( , 1973 . In fact, the proper assignment of expenditures and taxes among federal and local governments and the proper design of intergovernmental transfers are prerequisites for efficient and equitable public service provision at both the national and local levels. One of the most important goals in establishing a sound intergovernmental fiscal relationship is to promote both local and national economic growth (see also Rivlin 1992 , Bird 1993 , Gramlich 1993 , and Oates 1973 .
In view of the important link between the design of intergovernmental fiscal relationships and economic growth, it is natural for us to extend the Barro model and provide an analytical framework for both theoretical and empirical research on the growth effects of public expenditures, taxes, and federal transfers in a federation or in multiple levels of government. This is the main task of our paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 extends the Barro model with one aggregate government spending and one flat income tax to include: (1) public expenditures by both the federal government and local governments; (2) various taxes by both the federal government and local governments; and (3) a federal transfer to a locality 4 . Section 3 derives the rate of endogenous growth. With both simulations and special examples, section 4 examines the change in the rate of endogenous growth with respect to federal income tax, local income tax, and federal transfers. Section 5 derives the optimal federal government income tax rate, local government income tax rate, and the federal matching transfer for the locality. Section 6 presents a more general model with local government consumption tax and property tax. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The Model
Following Arrow and Kurz (1970) , Barro (1990), and Turnovsky (2000) , we 3 Of course, the empirical analyses in many of these studies have followed the much-cited work of Aschauer (1989) . 4 The setup of our model is also very different from the dynamic analysis of Zou (1994 Zou ( , 1996 in quite a few respects. First, the focus here is the rate of endogenous growth instead of the traditional long-run analysis of the steady state; second, the representative agent's utility and production function are defined on both federal and local spending instead of only on local spending; third, federal taxation, federal transfer, and federal spending are fully integrated into the introduce public expenditures by the federal government and local governments into the representative agent's utility function and production function. Federal spending is denoted by f , local public spending by s , and private consumption by c . The instantaneous utility of the representative agent is given by ( , , ) u c f s , which has the following properties:
To derive analytical solution for the endogenous growth rate, we extend the utility function of Barro (1990) as follows
where 0   is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
The representative agent seeks to maximize a discounted utility, as given by 0 ( , , ) ,
where 0 1    is the constant rate of time preference.
The agent has access to the extended Arrow-Kurz-Barro neoclassical production function ( , , ) ,
where y is output and k is private capital stock.
The role of government services in both the utility function and the production function was introduced to dynamic analysis of public investment and growth by Arrow and Kurz (1970) . The approach to endogenous growth models was popularized by Barro (1990) . In recent studies on fiscal decentralization and growth, the Arrow-Kurz-Barro approach to preferences and technology has been extended to different public expenditures by multiple levels of government; see Brueckner (1996) , Davoodi and Zou (1998) , and Zhang and Zou (1998) for examples. Again, the production function is assumed to have the following standard properties:
In this paper, the production function takes the CES form, Given the tax rates of the two levels of government, the budget constraint of the representative agent can be written as
The representative agent chooses a consumption path and a capital-accumulation path to maximize his discounted utility in equation (3) subject to constraint (8), and with his initial capital stock given by
The Hamiltonian associated with the optimization problem is defined as
where  is the costate variable, and it represents the marginal utility of wealth.
Now, the first-order conditions are Specifically, for the utility function in equation (2) and the production function in equation (5), we rewrite equations (9) and (10) 
Equation (12) states that the marginal utility of wealth equals the marginal utility of consumption at an optimum. Equation (13) is the familiar Euler equation for consumption with multiple government services and tax rates.
The Balanced Growth Rate
Suppose that the economy is on the balanced growth path where private consumption, private capital, federal government expenditure, local government expenditure, and output all grow at the same rate denoted as  , i.e,
Substituting condition (14) into equations (8) and (13), we obtain
.
Substituting equation (17) into equation (16), we derive the consumption-capital ratio as
On the other hand, from government budget constraints (6) and (7), and combining tax k  , but we cannot derive the explicit solution for the growth rate.
with equation (16), we obtain 1 1
Using equations (19) and (20), we have
Substituting equation (21) into equation (17) yields the explicit solution for the growth rate  :
Equation (22) (
At the same time, the TVC (11) gives
Equations (23) and (24) (6) and (7), we obtain
and (0) 
Now, from equation (5), we have
Thus, we obtain the initial output as a function of the initial capital stock, (0) k as follows:
With (0) y given in equation (28) 
With the aid of explicit solutions for the growth rate, we can analyze the effects on growth of the federal government's income tax, the local government's income tax, and the federal government's matching transfer. Using the explicit paths of the capital accumulation, consumption, and government's spending, we can derive the social welfare function, and then we can derive the optimal tax rate and government transfer to maximize the social welfare. We will process these in the next section.
Effects of Taxes and Federal Transfers
Differentiating equation (22) ( 
Equations (30), (31), and (32) state the ambiguous effects on growth of the federal government income tax rate, f  , local government's income tax rate, s  , and the federal matching grant for locality, g . For the intuition, we present some numerical solutions. . In all three cases, Figure 1 presents typical Laffer curves relating the growth rate to federal income tax. In the case of equal marginal productivity of federal government expenditure and local government expenditure, given local tax, federal transfer, and all other parameters in our model, a rise in federal income tax will increase the growth rate before the tax rate hits around 13 percent. In fact, when the federal income tax rate rises from zero to 10 percent, the growth rate rises from zero percent to almost 4.4 percent. Further increases in the federal income tax rate above 13 percent will reduce the growth rate. Just before the federal income tax rate reaches a high of 60 percent (note that the local income tax rate is assumed to be 10 percent), the growth rate is around zero.
The explanation for this Laffer curve is as follows. A change in federal income tax has three effects. First, a higher federal income tax directly reduces the return on private capital and the growth rate directly. Second, a larger tax revenue implies higher federal expenditure, which is assumed to increase both private utility and private productivity.
The rising productivity of private capital raises the growth rate. Third, at the same time, a larger tax revenue can lead to a larger federal transfer to local government, whose public services are also utility-and productivity-enhancing. When the federal income tax rate is initially very small, the second and third forces dominate. When the federal income tax is already high, the first force dominates.
For the effects of federal government expenditure and local government expenditure, we find that as the marginal productivity of local government expenditure increases, the growth rate decreases before the critical point of federal government income tax rate
. The critical point of that rate, which reaches the maximum growth rate, decreases. In fact, from equation (22), we have
In this special case, For the equal marginal productivity of federal and local government expenditure, as the base federal income tax is already at a relatively high rate of 20 percent, the growth rate is rising with local income tax until s  reaches about 5 percent. When the local income tax rate is set at 20 percent, the growth rate is zero. Because the local government receives a matching grant from the federal government at a rate of 30 percent, and because it also raises tax revenues from consumption tax and property tax, the local government can still finance its productive public expenditures without resorting to income tax. This is why the growth rate in Figure 2 is still above 3 percent even though local income tax is zero.
We present similar effects of federal government expenditure and local government expenditure, in this case We obtain three different effects on growth of a federal matching grant for the local government: when the marginal productivity of federal government spending is larger than the marginal productivity local government spending, i.e.    , the federal government matching transfer will decrease the growth rate. When the two government have the same marginal productivity, there is a non-evidence effect of the matching transfer on growth before 0.5 g  . When local government expenditure has relatively larger marginal productivity, we find the contrasting solution whereby as the federal matching transfer increases, the growth rate increases before 0.6 g  . We find that the effects of a federal matching transfer on growth can be negative when it is too large (say, 
Optimal Taxes and Transfers

Growth Maximization and Welfare Maximization
In the last section, we numerically presented the relationships among f  , s  , g , and the growth. Recall that Barro (1990) shows that maximizing social welfare is equivalent to maximizing the rate of growth, and the optimal tax rate equals the marginal contribution of government expenditure. To compare our solutions with that of Barro (1990) , we reexamine the conclusions we have drawn by using the special production function. In this section, we specify the production function as the Cobb-Douglas production function, which amounts to set 0   in the CES production function, namely,
where  ,  , and  are positive constants with
Hence, the explicit balanced growth rate expressed in equation (22) has the following form,
On the other hand, if we substitute the growth paths (25) for consumption, federal spending, and local government spending into the utility function in (2), the agent's welfare is given as
)
We thank the associate editor very much to point out this.
Thus, we have
and
Equation (40') yields the same expression as equations (38') and (39'). Hence, we know that optimal choices of f  , s  , and g are interdependent. The choice of the federal matching grant is endogenous in the following sense: once g is chosen from the interval (0,1) , federal income tax and local income tax are determined by (38') and (39').
From equations (38') and (39'), we obtain the optimal tax rates as
for the federal government and local government, respectively.
Once g is given in the interval (0, 1) , the federal and local income taxes are determined by their productiveness and the matching rate multiplied by the productivity of local public spending. The aggregate optimal tax rate is just the sum of the 8 The Jacobian matrix at the optimal taxes can be derived as 
It is easy to prove that this matrix is negative definite. Therefore, the second-order conditions are satisfied.
productiveness of federal and local expenditures:
With the choices of tax rates and transfer specified in equations (41) and (42), the growth-maximizing growth rate is
We should say something about the effects of optimal government matching transfer and effects of the matching transfer on the growth. In the last section, we showed the government matching transfer can affect growth but the optimal choices of government matching transfer and the tax rates are interdependent. This occurs because, from equations (6) and (7), we have
The government transfer becomes an independent variable. We can also derive the equation with only the federal government income tax rate and government matching transfer; thus, the local government income tax rate becomes an independent variable.
The effects of government matching transfer in the last section are based on the selected federal and local income tax rates. Thus, we obtain the effects shown in Figure 3 .
In addition, given the local income tax rate, from equations (38') and (40') we can determine the optimal choices for the government matching transfer and federal income tax rate.
A More General Framework
We can extend our analytical framework to a more general one and consider more tax rates. The same set up is used for the federal government but we introduce two more taxes for the typical local government. It now levies three taxes: a local income tax (such as the case of state income tax in the United States) at the rate of s  , a consumption tax the federal transfer, as shown in equation (46).
Conclusion
This paper has extended the Barro (1990) model with single aggregate government spending and one flat income tax to include public expenditures and taxes by multiple levels of government. We have derived the rate of endogenous growth under quite general specifications of preferences and production technology. With simulations, we have examined how the rate of endogenous growth changes with respect to federal income tax, local income tax, and federal transfer. We have also discussed growth-maximizing choices of income taxes and federal transfer. In addition, we extend our model to a more general framework including a local consumption tax and local property tax. A preliminary simulation analysis has shown that the local property tax has the largest negative impact on the rate of economic growth, whereas a local consumption tax is always growth enhancing. This finding contrasts with that of Rebelo (1991) , who
shows that a consumption tax has no effect on the growth rate.
The model in this paper sets up a positive framework for evaluating how the assignment of taxes and expenditures among different levels of government and intergovernmental transfers affect economic growth. Our analysis also sheds light on the role of intergovernmental transfers in regional economic growth. If a local government has sufficient revenue base, federal transfers seem to reduce the growth rate. Even if local revenue is not sufficient, the rise in the rate of federal transfer increases the growth rate to a very modest degree. Of course, the model is also useful for normative discussions of the welfare-and growth-maximizing choices of taxes, transfers, and expenditures in the context of fiscal federalism.
In future, we will add two more dimensions: one will be to follow Arrow and Kurz (1970) and introduce public consumption and public capital accumulation at both the federal and local levels into the endogenous growth model; the other will be to formulate a game-theoretical growth model and allow strategic interactions between the federal government and multiple local governments in the choices of taxes, public expenditures, and intergovernmental transfers.
